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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the strategic uncertainties and impacts created by high-profile data breaches
and discusses the unique strategic problem presented by information security breaches for
organizational executives. Based on theory regarding strategic uncertainties, we develop a
framework depicting a strategic perspective on breaches within and outside the firm. Then, within
the major categories outlined by the framework, this research evaluates instances of 17 public
disclosures of high-profile data breaches over the past four years. Based on our discussion of these
17 cases, we identify six major issues complicating strategic decision-making regarding security
breaches and discuss guidance for managers.

INTRODUCTION
Information security breaches are a serious problem for businesses across the world.
Information security breaches can cause extensive damage, including the theft of corporate
property, loss of corporate secrets and exposure of sensitive data (Bose & Leung, 2008; Crosman,
2014; Jensen, Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017; Weise, 2014a; Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger,
& Marett, 2014). Experts estimate that the average cost to a firm resulting from a security breach
is $3.9 million (Ponemon, 2015, 2018), with security breaches at large organizations resulting in
significantly higher costs. For example, a November 2013 security breach at Target cost the firm
an estimated $148 million and a breach at Home Depot cost an estimated $62 million (Vinton,
2014). More recently, a massive breach at Equifax is believed to be the most costly in history, with
direct costs exceeding $439 million and estimates that final costs may exceed $600 million
(McCrank & Finkle, 2018).
In spite of the increasing prominence of information security breaches and their consequences,
evidence suggests organizations are not adequately planning and preparing for cyber-attacks. A
study by IBM finds that 77% of business leaders do not have an established cybersecurity incident
response plan, and 57% of these leaders report that cyber incidents are taking longer to resolve
(Forrest, 2018). Another study suggests that roughly half of key IT decision makers believe that
their organization’s top executives are not giving appropriate attention to IT security (Ismail,
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2017). As a result, evidence suggests that many executives are not dedicating enough time and
resources to properly support information security and to prepare for information security failures.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to help managers and non-information
technology (IT) executives understand the complexities and uncertainties surrounding data
breaches in the modern business environment. To do so, we leverage theories of strategic
uncertainty and environmental scanning (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1989; Courtney, Kirkland, &
Viguerie, 1997; Elenkov, 1997). Models of scanning behavior suggest that executives scan their
business environments for sources of strategic uncertainty, which are uncertainties within the
environment perceived to potentially impact organizational performance (Elenkov, 1997). While
many sources of strategic uncertainty are contingent on a firm’s industry, such as the price of key
raw materials for a manufacturer, we argue that information security breaches are unique because
they represent a key source of strategic uncertainty for any business that uses information
technology—which includes virtually all modern businesses. Combined with the lack of planning
reported above, we believe it is necessary for executives to understand information security risks
as a key source of strategic uncertainty and to plan accordingly.
To frame these strategic uncertainties for non-IT executives, we develop a high-level
framework that depicts the strategic impacts of security breaches within the context of a dynamic
business environment. Our intention is to highlight and frame issues that are relevant for non-IT
executives to understand from a strategic point of view, but to avoid becoming overly entangled
in technical complexities.
To develop the framework, we sought to gather data from firms that experienced security
failures. Due to the sensitive nature of security breaches and potential legal ramifications for
breached firms, collecting primary data via interviews or surveys directly from recently breached
firms is impractical. As a result, we leverage secondary data. We identified 17 major security
breaches from 2014-2017 (see Table 1) and reviewed these cases to develop the framework and
implications discussed in this paper.
Our contribution is threefold. First, for non-IT executives, we provide high-level guidance
regarding the unique strategic uncertainties related to IT security, intending to drive thoughtful
conversation with IT staff when making appropriate security-related decisions. Second, for IT
personnel, we provide a framework that may be useful when explaining and justifying securityrelated investments to organizational executives. Third, for academics, we intend for the
framework and issues discussed in this paper to highlight interesting and novel paths of research
in the areas of strategic management and information systems.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we develop a conceptual framework to provide a highlevel perspective on IT operational failures, strategic impacts and environmental influences. Next,
we leverage the conceptual framework to discuss six specific issues of interest to business
executives, along with practical guidance to help executives discuss appropriate responses with IT
2
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personnel. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of limitations and suggestions for future
research.
Table 1: Summary of Major Security Breaches 2014-2017 Reviewed
Organization
Anthem
Ashley Madison
Community
Health Systems
eBay

Year
Size of Breach
Disclosed
2015
80 million customers
2015
32 million user accounts
2014
4.5 million patients
2014

145 million user accounts

Equifax
Home Depot

2017
2014

147 million Americans
56 million customers

JPMorgan Chase

2014

LinkedIn
Premera Blue
Cross
Sony Pictures

2016
2015

76 million customers
7 million small businesses
167 million user accounts
11 million customers

2014

47,000 employees

Target
Tumblr
Uber

2014
2016
2017

Verizon

2016

Yahoo
Yahoo
Yahoo

2016
2016
2017

40 million customers
65 million user accounts
57 million driver and rider
accounts
1 million enterprise
customers
500 million user accounts
1 billion user accounts
3 billion user accounts

Source(s)
(Collins, 2015; Vinton, 2015)
(Thomsen, 2015; Zetter, 2015b)
(McCarthy, 2015; Weise,
2014b)
(Collins, 2015; McCarthy,
2015; Reisinger, 2014)
(Fung, 2018; O'Brien, 2017)
(Collins, 2015; McCarthy,
2015; Vinton, 2014)
(Collins, 2015; McCarthy,
2015; Reuters, 2014)
(Hackett, 2016)
(Collins, 2015; Vinton, 2015)
(Collins, 2015; Pagliery, 2014;
Roettgers, 2015)
(Collins, 2015; Vinton, 2014)
(Kovacs, 2016)
(Issac, Benner, & Frenkel,
2017; Newcomer, 2017)
(Narcisi & Kuranda, 2016)
(Fiegerman, 2016a)
(Fiegerman, 2016b)
(Larson, 2017)

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Organizations operate under conditions of uncertainty (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1989; Courtney et
al., 1997; Elenkov, 1997). Executives engage in scanning behavior to identify strategic
uncertainties that significantly affect the future performance of the organization (Elenkov, 1997).
Strategic uncertainties vary significantly from industry to industry and business to business, as
factors that may dramatically impact one business may not impact another (e.g., industry-related
3

ISSN: 2163-9280

Fall 2019
Volume 17, Number 1

legislation, availability of distribution channels, price of key raw materials or consumer trends).
Given the ubiquity of information technology and the extent to which it is embedded across almost
all industries, we suggest that information security-related risks are unique in that they represent
key sources of strategic uncertainty for virtually all modern businesses that leverage information
technology.
Research posits four increasing levels of strategic uncertainty (Courtney et al., 1997). Level 1,
or low uncertainty, suggests a rather clear future where events are relatively predictable. Level 2
implies a set of discrete alternatives (i.e. three distinct possible outcomes), where the future may
consist of distinct and identifiable paths. Level 3 indicates a range of futures determined by
different variables, and that future outcomes lie along a continuum rather than discrete outcomes,
and the outcomes vary according to the strength and influence of each variable. Level 4 represents
true ambiguity where the future cannot reasonably be predicted due to extremely high levels of
uncertainty (Courtney et al., 1997). Accordingly, as the level of strategic uncertainty increases, the
ability to engage in strategic planning and analysis becomes more difficult.
We suggest that strategic uncertainties surrounding information security exist at Level 3. The
possible outcomes of information security failures are generally well known and established, but
do not exist in easily categorized discrete outcomes. The consequences of information security
failures vary according to many different factors, such as the extent and nature of data lost, how
quickly the breach was identified and addressed, whether the breach impacted business partners,
the malicious intentions of the attacker, and so forth. Accordingly, understanding the nature of
information security risks and planning accordingly is a difficult task, especially for organizational
executives who often lack a highly technical background. This is an especially critical task, though,
since roughly half of IT personnel report that executives do not give IT security enough attention
(Ismail, 2017) and IBM reports that about 3/4ths of organizations do not have necessary IT security
plans in place (Forrest, 2018).
Chief executives are in a precarious position regarding information security strategy and
managing these strategic uncertainties. Top management personnel are in the best position to make
decisions regarding information security strategy and the level of investment in security (Ross &
Weill, 2002; Weill & Ross, 2004), yet strategic decisions regarding information security are often
a decision-making quandary for top executives. On one hand, decisions to enhance and pursue
higher levels of information security may effectively minimize risks associated with security
breaches and data leaks. This direction may be in the best ethical interest of various stakeholders
in the firm, including employees and customers. On the other hand, the decision to extensively
pursue and heavily invest in higher levels of information security may actually run cross purposes
with organizational and strategic goals. Over emphasizing security may draw a firm’s attention
away from strategic initiatives that offer greater potential for growth and profitability (Ocasio,
1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005) or may limit a firm’s ability to create customized and proprietary
information technology products and services (Anderson, 2001).
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Security-related decision-making and the consequences of data breaches do not occur in
isolation. To frame the relationship, we depict a conceptual framework in Figure 1. Although far
more specific and granular taxonomies of information security threats have been developed (e.g.,
Cebula & Young, 2010), we opt to develop a higher level conceptual framework to depict issues
at a more strategic level, as opposed to a discussion of threats that might be more technical than
many managers and executives may find practical.
At the center of the figure, we see two firms. Within each firm, we consider the risks and
consequences directly associated with each firm’s own IT operational failures and the direct
strategic impacts of operational failures. Although our interest focuses specifically on data
breaches, we use the term IT operational failure in the figure to more broadly include a variety of
situations where IT-related failures may have significant consequences and to provide a framework
useful for other avenues of research. Numerous taxonomies exist depicting the variety of IT
operational failures; these potential cyber security risks include the actions of people, system and
technology failures, internal process failures and external events, such as fires or natural disasters
(Cebula & Young, 2010).
We consider that each firm’s own operational failures may cause immediate and direct strategic
consequences for the firm, as depicted by the arrow flowing upwards. For example, during
Amazon’s “Prime Day” shopping event, the Amazon website experienced technical glitches over
the first hours and estimates suggest the malfunctions cost Amazon nearly $100 million in sales
(Korosec, 2018). Of course, as discussed heavily above, large scale data breaches often have major
repercussions for firms in terms of revenue and brand image.
Additionally, we consider that IT operational failures (i.e., security breaches) at other firms
may directly result in enhanced attacks on another firm’s IT operations, as depicted by the twoway arrow between the two firms at the IT operational level. For example, hackers were able to
gain entrance to Target’s information systems after garnering user credentials from Fazio
Mechanical Services, a refrigeration, heating and air conditioning subcontractor (Krebs, 2014).
Furthermore, consider the problem of password re-use by users, and how password credentials
stolen through another security breach might be used to target user accounts within another firm if
the users re-use the same password (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004). Additionally, consider that
security breaches within a firm might result in cyber-attackers using the breach to enable an attack
on a business partner—exposing the initial firm to even more liability, or at least a damaged
relationship with a business partner. As a result, we reinforce the notion that firms, and their IT
operations, do not exist in isolation, but firms are influenced indirectly and directly by the
operational failures and consequences of other firms.
Finally, we consider that firms do not exist in isolation but operate and compete in a modern
marketplace where they influence, and are influenced by, customers, competitors, business
partners, regulatory agencies and other external actors and forces. Broadly speaking, major actions
or events experienced by the firm may influence others in the environment while the environment
simultaneously impacts the firm (Jones & Karsten, 2008) as depicted by positioning each firm
5
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within the environmental context and externalities. For example, the 2017 Equifax breach, wherein
sensitive personal information, including social security numbers, names and addresses, on 147
million Americans was exposed (O'Brien, 2017) occurred in a context where hundreds of millions
of individuals had already experienced losing user account data (e.g., eBay, Yahoo and LinkedIn
breaches), healthcare-related personal information (e.g., Anthem, Community Health Systems and
Premera Blue Cross breaches), and credit card information (e.g., Target and Home Depot
breaches). Had the Equifax breach occurred a decade ago before data breaches were commonplace,
the revelation might have been shocking to stakeholders, including customers, business partners
and investors, with devastating consequences for Equifax’s ability to continue operations. Instead,
in spite of the most expensive data breach ever (McCrank & Finkle, 2018), such breaches appear
to be “business as usual” with firms not experiencing crippling long-term consequences—as we
discuss in more depth later in this paper.
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Environmental Context and Externalities

Strategic
Impact

Strategic
Impact

IT Operational Failure

IT Operational Failure

Firm A

Firm B

In summary, the key takeaways of the proposed framework are as follows: First, IT operational
failures, such as data breaches, have various consequences. Those consequences might include a
wide range of outcomes, including additional cyber-attacks within the firm or on other firms as
well as direct and indirect strategic impacts. Second, we suggest that IT operational failures
permeate into the general environment in which the firm operates and that the continually changing
external environment contextualizes the consequences of operational failures within a firm based
on other breaches and failures that have occurred and continue to occur in the environment.

CASE ANALYSIS
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There are numerous factors at work in the discussion of information security investments.
Almost none of these factors are straightforward or simple to interpret which vastly complicates
the decision-making process. Based on analysis of the 17 breaches previously identified, the
following sections frame six major issues based on our conceptual framework (see Figure 1)
demonstrating why information security issues are such challenging and complex strategic
uncertainties for executives. We identify two major issues based on IT Operational Failures, two
based on Strategic Impacts and two based on Environmental Context and Externalities. After
discussing each issue, we provide general guidance for managers and decision-makers.
IT Operational Failures
1. Information security must protect everywhere, but cyber-attackers only need one
weakness.
IT operational failures represent a key source of strategic uncertainty for organizations, and
security failures are a significant source of risk (Goldstein, Chernobai, & Benaroch, 2011). In
dealing with this source of risk, a primary problem among security personnel is the game of “cat
and mouse” between an organization’s security personnel and the cyber-attackers intent on
compromising the organization’s systems. Security personnel must find and patch every security
flaw while the attackers need only find one significant flaw, which puts security personnel in the
position of needing to be comprehensive and verify that there are no vulnerabilities. As security
researcher Ross Anderson writes:
So information warfare looks rather like air warfare looked in the 1920s and 1930s. Attack
is simply easier than defense. Defending a modern information system could also be
likened to defending a large, thinly-populated territory like the nineteenth century Wild
West: the men in black hats can strike anywhere, while the men in white hats have to defend
everywhere. (p. 5, Anderson, 2001)
Ultimately, security breaches result from a wide variety of sources, including from breaches at
business partners, customers or suppliers. In the attack on Target, the intruders first breached one
of Target’s vendors, Fazio Mechanical Services, an HVAC service provider, and then used Fazio’s
vendor credentials to access Target’s systems (Krebs, 2014). In yet another type of threat, an
executive at Ashley Madison speculated that their data breach resulted from an inside job and was
perpetrated, at least in part, by an individual with access to organizational systems (Krebs, 2015).
Other breaches result from more direct attacks on organizational systems, such as the Home Depot
data breach, which was enabled by malware designed to steal credit and debit card information
from point of sale systems (Vinton, 2014). Other attacks on Anthem, Community Health Systems
and Premera Blue Cross also purportedly used malware designed to gain access to systems and
expose personal medical data to the attackers. The many possible attack vectors create a significant
source of uncertainty for security personnel.
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The need for comprehensive security is a significant problem because it places organizations
in the position of having to constantly identify key weaknesses from a wide range of possibilities
and to shore up those weaknesses before cyber-attackers can identify and capitalize on them. As a
result, decision makers have to consider both technical and human security weaknesses.
In order to counteract the continuing threat of security breaches, management needs to engage
in active risk management processes. Risk management is an approach to handling strategic
uncertainties (K. D. Miller, 1992) and addresses the process of identifying and analyzing risks,
then implementing appropriate risk management plans to minimize the potential damages of the
identified risks (Boehm, 1991). After identifying relevant risks, four risk management options
include (1) risk avoidance, (2) risk transference, (3) risk reduction, and (4) risk acceptance
(Blakley, McDermott, & Geer, 2001; Boehm, 1991). We discuss each of these options in more
detail below.
First, managers can choose to alter plans and processes to avoid risks, such as not collecting
consumer data or allowing consumers to create user accounts in order to avoid losing their data
and any associate liability. Second, managers can choose to transfer risks to another party, either
through outsourcing operations or by purchasing insurance. For example, managers might
outsource customer relationship management processes to a vendor in order to avoid risks
associated with security liabilities. Alternatively, managers might hire an outside firm to manage
IT security processes with the expectation that fallout from security breaches fall to the IT security
provider. To transfer financial risk, a firm may buy insurance against security breach damages. For
instance, Equifax received $125 million from insurance to help defray the cost of their recent
breach (McCrank & Finkle, 2018). Third, firms might invest heavily in information security, such
as improved technology, investments in personnel, or enhanced policies, in order to reduce the risk
of security breaches. Fourth, firms may simply acknowledge that the risk exists and accept the
associated risk of damage, but choose not to avoid, transfer or reduce the risk. In this case, firms
might set aside funding to pay for associated damages in the event that breaches do occur.
Although a comprehensive guide to risk management is beyond the scope of this paper, useful
guides are available to help manage and frame organizational response to key uncertainties (see
for example Boehm, 1991). Depending on the size of the organization and resources available,
executives may choose to hire vendors to engage in risk management planning, hire or assign
personnel to address risk management, or engage in risk management planning personally. The
level of resource investment in risk management planning should be commensurate with the
perceived level of risk the organization attaches to their IT operations.
2. Information security requires extensive technical security, yet human security failures
can bypass even sophisticated technical security.
Organizations that choose to invest in mitigating the significant threat posed by security
breaches rely on technological interventions, such as a comprehensive suite of information
technology and security tools, including use of passwords, firewalls, antivirus, encryption and
8
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blocking/filtering technologies and more. These tools are necessary to protect against common
threats, such as direct network intrusions, the illicit monitoring of unsecured communications, and
attacks via malware, worms or viruses. However, strong security technology is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition to prevent security breaches.
The human element of information security magnifies the uncertainties attached to information
security. The situation is reminiscent of the classic urban legend scenario where a baby sitter is
repeatedly harassed by a threatening caller, and when they police trace the phone call, they realize
the calls are coming from inside the house. For organizations, security risks and failures often
come from inside the organization due to human failures.
Whereas the technology tools used for security may be circumvented or overcome, their
technological nature means the tools operate in a relatively consistent and predictable way. The
human users of organizational information systems play a critical role in maintaining information
security, but are much less consistent and predictable (Wright et al., 2014). In spite of the strength
of information security measures, if system users surrender login credentials or inadvertently
install malicious software on their computers, technical security features can be bypassed and
rendered ineffective. For instance, in a cyber-attack on defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton,
an executive was sent an email with an attachment ostensibly containing details from the Pentagon
(Grow, Epstein, & Tschang, 2008). Though appearing credible, the email attachment contained
malware that, if opened, was designed to track the user’s keystrokes and to provide access to the
cyber-attacker.
In fact, social engineering is a noted intrusion technique (Mitnick & Wimon, 2005). Social
engineering targets system users or organizational employees as a key weakness in a security
system and capitalize on psychology and influence techniques to elicit compliance from system
users in an attempt to fool them into revealing login credentials, install malicious software, or
otherwise provide further access and control to the cyber-attacker. As a result, users and IT
personnel must be ever vigilant against the threat of cyber-attack. Organizations therefore need
interventions to prepare and encourage users to remain vigilant against such threats.
In order to counteract the threat of human vulnerabilities, organizations need to regularly
engage in current information security training and to create and encourage users to comply with
information security policies (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Puhakainen & Siponen,
2010; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014). Information security policies should be developed
and communicated to employees to establish safeguards against access by unauthorized users and
loss of data assets. While generic information security policy templates are widely available, firms
should engage in development of custom firm-specific policies to the extent that their operations
or data assets are idiosyncratic or highly valuable. Furthermore, at the very least, users should be
trained on how to recognize common social engineering attacks, such as phishing and spear
phishing, which are commonly used to try to steal credentials and access proprietary information
(Jensen et al., 2017). While traditional anti-phishing training focused on memorizing sets of rules,
more current approaches support embedded training with simulated phishing emails (Kumaraguru
9
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et al., 2009) or training users to think more mindfully about suspicious emails and what they ask
of the recipient (Jensen et al., 2017).
For executives to effectively engage in risk management regarding the strategic uncertainties
attached to information security, they must understand that even the most sophisticated
technological interventions can be undermined by oblivious or under-trained users within the
organization. In other words, even the most sophisticated security measures can be undone by
users mindlessly but willingly giving away sensitive data to a well-designed attack. As a result,
executives should understand that a comprehensive plan to manage risks involves appropriate
investment in the organization’s human capital through training and development in conjunction
with investment in technological capital. This is particularly crucial for executives to understand,
since research indicates that top management support for training contributes to training
effectiveness (Cromwell & Kolb, 2004; Facteau, Dobbins, Russell, Ladd, & Kudisch, 1995).
Strategic Impacts
3. Security breaches have immediate financial consequences, but long-term financial
damages may be limited depending on the nature of the breach.
After experiencing security breaches, firms face immediate costs such as identifying the source
of the breach, resolving the security weakness, paying regulatory fines, absorbing the cost of class
action lawsuits and paying reparations for damages to customers, employees or partners. There
may also be long-term and harder to quantify damages in terms of harm to a reputation or lost
revenue that may significantly damage a firm’s ability to compete in the marketplace. The inability
to quantify the various costs magnifies the level of strategic uncertainty attached to IT security
risks. At face value, the financial damages of security breaches are significant. In fact, one report
suggests that 60% of small businesses go bankrupt within 6 months of a cyber-attack (Miller, G.,
2016), which is understandable in light of recent analyses suggesting that the cost of the average
security breach has risen over the past several years to an average of $3.9 million (Ponemon, 2015,
2018). Table 2 reports the available estimated direct costs for the security breaches we identified
for this study.
Table 2: Estimated Direct Cost of Security Breaches
Organization
Anthem
Community Health Systems
Equifax
Home Depot
Sony
Target
Yahoo*

Estimated Direct Cost
>$100 million
>$100 million
$439 million
$62 million
$15 million
$148 million
$350 million

*cost represents reduction in sales price as purchased by Verizon
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Though the numbers associated with the security breaches are large, they may appear less
significant when framed relative to overall firm revenue. For example, the security breach costs
were estimated at less than 2% of Sony’s 2014 sales, less than 0.1% of Target’s 2014 sales, and
less than 0.01% of 2014 sales for Home Depot (Hackett, 2015). Even regarding Equifax’s breach
which is considered to be the most expensive in history, at $439 million, after the $125 million
covered by insurance (McCrank & Finkle, 2018), the remaining $314 million is only 9.3% of 2017
revenue of $3.36 billion, and Equifax still declared net income of $587 million for 2017. Another
path to view the damage caused by security breaches is to consider market reactions to the
announcement of the data breach. For the publicly traded firms that announced the discovery of a
large-scale data breach, Table 3 shows the stock’s closing price on the last trading day before the
firm announced the data breach, the first full day after the announcement and six months after the
announcement.
Although limited in sample size, results in Table 3 appear to indicate that there are not crippling
immediate, or long-term, impacts on the market value of a firm after experiencing a data breach.
In fact, over the six months following the disclosure of a security breach, the average change over
the six-month period was positive. The notion that data-related breaches are not particularly
damaging to market value has some further support, as research finds that functional information
technology failures, such as websites failing to work properly, are much more damaging to a firm’s
market value (Goldstein et al., 2011) than are failures related to data assets (Acquisti, Friedman,
& Telang, 2006; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). More specifically, findings suggest
that public disclosure of security breaches results in an immediate negative impact on a firm’s
market value, but that this negative impact dissipates over time (Acquisti et al., 2006).
The financial data, though limited, seem to suggest that accepting the risk of breaches is a
financially viable alternative for firms, at least from a profit maximizing shareholder perspective.
In spite of the significant direct expenses incurred by breaches (see Table 2), these expenses might
be relatively small in relation to overall firm revenue, and the investors in these firms, on average,
seem willing to accept these expenses, as the average share price increased by a little over 4% over
the six months following the breach (see Table 3). If direct financial ramifications are limited and
market forces do not punish data breaches long-term, then the purely rational decision for
managers might be to underinvest and deprioritize information security and simply accept the risk
of data breaches unless sensitive or idiosyncratic data represents a key strategic resource which
the firm could not be competitive if it is lost.
On one hand, though limited in sample size, the findings indicated in Table 3 would seem to
indicate that for large, publicly traded firms, the strategic uncertainties from IT security risks can
potentially be addressed by simply accepting the risks of suffering a security breach. From a purely
economic perspective, as part of a risk management analysis, risk analysts estimate the probability
of relevant security breach scenarios, the cost associated with each, and compare those estimated
costs with the necessary security investments. If the cost of investing in security outweighs the
estimated costs (the probability of a breach multiplied by the estimated cost) of an associated
11
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Table 3: Market Impact of Disclosing Security Breach
Organization

Date Breach
Disclosed by
Organization

Closing
Stock
Price
Trading
Day
Before
Announcement

Closing
Stock
Price
Trading
Day
After
Announcement

Percent
Change

Stock Price Six
Months
After
Announcement

Percent
Change

Anthem

2/13/2015

$142.00

$141.76

-0.17%

$149.69

+5.14%

Community
Health
Systems
eBay

8/18/2014

$42.15

$42.48

+0.78%

$40.42

-4.10%

5/21/2014

$51.96

$51.50

-0.89%

$54.42

+4.52%

Equifax

9/7/2017

$141.39

$123.23

-12.84%

$121.12

-14.34%

Home Depot

9/8/2014

$91.61

$88.93

-3.01%

$115.25

+20.51%

JPMorgan
Chase
Sony

10/2/2014

$59.77

$60.30

+0.88%

$60.52

+1.24%

11/24/2014

$21.24

$21.63

+1.80%

$31.63

+32.85%

Target

12/19/2013

$63.55

$62.49

-1.70%

$58.74

-8.19%

Verizon

3/24/2016

$52.91

$53.40

+0.93%

$52.56

-0.66%

Average Change:

-1.58%

+4.11%

security failure, it would make economic sense for the firm to accept the risk of a breach. From a
shareholder perspective, at least, a cursory evaluation would indicate accepting security risks as a
viable scenario.
However, such a purely financial perspective on the cost of security breaches creates a moral
hazard, because the firm choosing not to invest in increased security is simply transferring risk to
another party who is not knowingly or willingly accepting that risk, such as their customers,
employees or business partners. This quandary invites consideration of a profit maximizing
shareholder perspective against that of a profit optimizing stakeholder perspective (Smith, 2003).
Furthermore, if many firms choose to accept these risks it likely creates a vicious cycle, wherein
breaches amongst these firms enable and drive more breaches amongst firms that are investing to
minimize security risks.
From a strategic perspective, financially surviving a security breach would appear to be
contingent on the level of resources available to the firm. As one security consultant writes:
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“Companies don’t go out of business due to a cybersecurity breach,” say
several well-versed cybersecurity experts. When I give them counterexamples to disprove their point, they list it as an aberration.
Here’s a less catchy but more accurate statement: “Large companies usually
don’t go out of business due to a large cybersecurity breach. They can often
get by with their CEO, CIO, and/or CISO getting fired. Medium and small
companies can go out of business or go bankrupt due to a cybersecurity
breach.” (Black, 2019)
As a result, it appears that large firms with ample resources can potentially be cavalier about
information security-related uncertainties. However, given that 60% of small business are reported
to be bankrupt within 6 months of a breach (Miller, G., 2016) and that the average cost of a breach
approaches $4 million (Ponemon, 2018), executives within small and medium-sized firms should
be take these uncertainties seriously and sensibly invest in information security seriously to ensure
the long-term viability of their business.
4. Traditionally, top management executives were not held individually responsible for
breaches, but recent cases suggest otherwise.
In the past, top management executives were relatively insulated from the fallout of
information security failures. Strategic uncertainties related to information security and IT
operations were, and still are, complicated and difficult to grasp. Since top managers were not
directly involved in the day-to-day IT activities that left a vulnerability exploited in a breach or
failed to identify an ongoing breach, there was a perception that they were not individually
responsible. It is impractical to expect top managerial executives to be tightly involved in the
design and arrangement of specific information security policies or tools, as it is almost certainly
outside their area of expertise and not necessarily a cost effective use of their time (Ross & Weill,
2002; Weill & Ross, 2004). Because of the perceived distance between C-level executives and
information security practices, repercussions for information security breaches rarely reached the
top echelons of management.
Now, it appears corporate level executives are going to be held to a higher level of
responsibility for information security failures (Misson, 2015). As cited above, for large firms top
executives, like the CEO or CIO might serve as a potential scapegoat in the fallout of a security
breach (Black, 2019). In several recent instances, a variety of top executives have left their
positions after significant security breaches, including the Target CEO (O'Connor, 2014), the Sony
Pictures co-chairman (Pallotta, 2015), two Equifax executives (Logan, 2017), the Yahoo head
lawyer (Goel, 2017), and the Ashley Madison CEO (Zetter, 2015a). In another instance, when
Uber data was breached, Uber paid the hackers $100,000 to delete the stolen data, which ultimately
resulted in the ousting of the Uber Chief Security Officer and a top deputy (Newcomer, 2017). In
fact, recent reports suggest that in almost one-third (31%) of data breaches, a C-level manager lost
their job (Barker, 2018; Pankov, 2018). This recent shift towards holding higher level executives
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accountable for security failures suggests a change in perspective regarding the role of top
executives in preventing breaches. Instead of assuming information security is beyond the scope
of top-level executive’s responsibility, the perspective seems to be changing towards expecting
top level executives to set the tone and overall strategy of the organization towards information
security. Now, top executives are more likely to be considered culpable when the information
security strategy fails (NeSmith, 2018).
Given the number of factors that seem to push large firms with ample resources towards simply
accepting the risk of security breaches, the tendency towards holding top management personally
accountable should steer firms towards other risk management decisions. These decisions might
be to minimize risk by investing in information security or to transfer risks to service or insurance
providers. As a result, we would expect that decision-makers may make more conservative
decisions regarding information security investment decisions than a purely economic perspective
would suggest. In other words, top managers should pay more attention to security issues, as
desired by their IT personnel (Ismail, 2017), and invest more time planning for security incidents
(Forrest, 2018)
Environmental Context and Externalities
5. Security breaches are becoming a more universally common experience and may
become more accepted as an inevitability in the information age.
Given the massive numbers associated with many of the high-profile data leaks, where the
number of people impacted regularly ranks in the millions and hundreds of millions, security
breaches are becoming a more universally common experience (see Table 1). Breaches include the
exposure of data from 3 billion Yahoo user accounts (Larson, 2017), 147 million Americans via
Equifax records (Fung, 2018; O'Brien, 2017), and millions of social media user accounts like
Tumblr (Kovacs, 2016) and LinkedIn (Hackett, 2016). Millions of consumers and employees are
impacted by security breaches on a regular basis, and security attacks are common for businesses;
research suggests that 43% of companies experienced a data breach in 2014 (Weise, 2014a). In
fact, a recent report suggests that data breaches are occurring at a faster rate than ever before, with
breaches in the first half of 2017 almost 30% higher than the same period in 2016 (Weisbaum,
2017).
Perversely, the increasing commonality of security breaches (Brino, 2012; Hulme, 2014;
Roettgers, 2015) may have counterintuitive consequences. Some indications suggest people are
becoming desensitized to the threat of security breaches and information leaks because such
breaches are beginning to feel commonplace (Crosman, 2014). According to Jake Kouns, chairman
of the Open Security Foundation, “There are so many breaches going, at some point we think data
breaches are going to jump the shark and no one’s going to care anymore. We’ll have that fatigue
of, ‘Another breach – what do I care?’” (cited in Crosman, 2014).
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In fact, given that breaches are becoming so seemingly commonplace and so large, users may
perceive a certain level of psychological safety being only one person among 10 or 100 million
records leaked. As the number of leaked files increases over time, those impacted by the leaks may
feel a comparatively lower level of risk given the significant number of people effected. In other
words, if an individual has personal data leaked in a breach impacting only 100 people, the risk of
their information being used for identity theft, fraud or another crime would appear much more
likely than for a breach impacting 100 million people. The large scale of the breaches make it seem
statistically less likely that any individual’s credentials will be used in a criminal manner.
Finally, there may be shifting social standards in terms of the ethical acceptability of publicly
displaying and discussing hacked or leaked documents. While public consumption of leaked
documents is not a universally accepted practice, in recent years, leaked documents from a variety
of government and corporate entities have begun appearing online at various locations, such as
WikiLeaks (www.wikileaks.org), which serve as public clearinghouses for distributing such
material. For example, WikiLeaks posted the 170,000+ emails and 30,000+ corporate documents
leaked via the Sony Pictures hack, and, as a result, individuals and media entities have analyzed
and discussed private emails sent by many high profile individuals, including executives such as
then-CEO Amy Pascal and Hollywood celebrities (Roettgers, 2015). In a similar instance, the user
data and corporate emails leaked as a result of the Ashley Madison hack have been analyzed and
discussed on public media websites to present arguments concerning misleading business practices
(Newitz, 2015). In a more controversial example, former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden,
who leaked U.S. intelligence materials to expose surveillance programs, is considered by some to
be a traitor but by others to be a hero (Rasmussen, 2013).
Though this topic is difficult to distill into specific guidance for management, it does raise
interesting questions and quandaries for managers. Long-term, organizations and decision-makers
ought to consider their role in the gradual transition towards a society where security breaches and
exposure of sensitive data and personal information becomes more commonplace. Although
businesses will always have incentive to protect their own sensitive data and intellectual property,
if societal norms change to where exposure of customer data becomes “business as usual,” then
incentives to protect and secure customer data are reduced. So long as financial penalties and
associated damages are high, businesses have significant financial incentive to carefully protect
customer data. If cultural norms change toward accepting the continual exposure of customer data
en masse, the financial motivation to protect customer data might eventually weaken. This would
economically incentivize the risk management decision to accept risk instead of minimizing or
transferring risk.
In the face of changing societal standards, this conversation invites consideration of the
shareholders versus stakeholders debate (Smith, 2003). The shareholders perspective suggests that
management has an obligation to maximize the return on investment for business owners—the
shareholders. The stakeholder perspective suggests that management has a moral obligation to
balance the best interests of the shareholders with the best interests of all major stakeholders in the
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business, including employees, customers, business partners, community members, and so forth.
In the face of increasing rates of security breaches (Weisbaum, 2017), firms will need to decide if
they intend to surrender to the seeming inevitability of security breaches or to invest resources and
energy into protecting sensitive data. Furthermore, firms should consider that their approach to
information security does not occur in isolation. The extent to which a firm invests in security
impacts the external business environment by either increasing the rate of breaches through lax
standards or minimizing the rate of breaches through investing in security.
6. Even though increasing security may be in the best interest of the consumers and
employees, consumers and employees may not want increased security.
Customer data is one of the most notable pieces of data stolen in numerous high-profile
breaches. However, despite the clear risks posed by information security breaches, customers and
employees may both resist or dislike initiatives to increase information security that directly impact
their processes or user experience. Such attempts to increase security may often be met with user
resistance or avoidance behaviors. Organizations can try to increase information security by
requiring longer, more complicated passwords, by requiring that passwords are changed more
often, or by creating multiple security checks to verify an individual’s identity. These attempts to
increase security may actively frustrate users and potentially discourage them from using the
service in the first place, which could hamper an organization’s growth and profitability.
Furthermore, organizations seeking to enhance information security could consider using more
advanced security tools, such as two-factor authentication, where a user must possess a second
authenticating device (such as an authorized cell phone) in order to log in to a system, or could
implement biometric tools, such as a fingerprint scanner, to verify credentials. However, not all
consumers are educated about the use of more elaborate security countermeasures or would
necessarily be motivated to absorb the cost of extra time and money to implement the added
security.
Organizations have a lot more power over securing the behavior of their employees, and
employers can require compliance with a variety of information security protocols, such as the
changing of passwords or the use of encryption services to access corporate networks. However,
increased security may be in the best interest of the organization and even of the employees, who
may risk the exposure of personal data (e.g., Pagliery, 2014). Employees may even knowingly
deactivate or circumvent security protocols due to their potential negative impact on their
individual performance and productivity (Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007; Workman,
Bommer, & Straub, 2008). In other words, there are instances where increased security protocols,
which are in the best interest of the organization and all employees, run cross-purpose to the
immediate self-interest of the employee desiring to maximize their own short-term productivity.
Further complicating the issue of security behaviors are the various motivations and desires of
the users. There is also the risk of deliberate acts of information theft (Whitman, 2003) and that
individuals with access to organizational systems participate in a security breach to damage or
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steal from their employer (Krebs, 2015). Finally, in rare instances, employees might intentionally
leak data to serve as a whistleblower on what they perceive to be illegal or unethical organizational
practices, such as the case of Edward Snowden leaking information on U.S. intelligence and
surveillance programs (Mazzetti & Schmidt, 2013). Therefore, decision-makers must account for
the various shortcomings and diverse motivations of organizational users and personnel with
access to secure systems.
Implementing security policies concerning employees and customers are separate, but related
issues. In both instances, bolstering security processes with more stringent requirements may
inhibit use of the systems the processes are intended to protect. For example, an organization might
require employees to change passwords every 30 days and to use two-factor authentication to
validate access to sensitive systems. In return, employees might leave passwords written on a note
near their computer or might avoid using the system altogether. In order to garner employee
support for stringent security policies, organizations may need to engage in education and training
campaigns to convince users of the necessity of tight security. Employees may need to be
convinced that security is the responsibility of every employee. Education campaigns may benefit
from convincing employees that security is in their own best interest, as these practices protect
their own credentials (which could potentially be used to access other accounts held by the
individual, such as banking or financial information) as well as their long-term job security by
protecting the firm’s ongoing processes.
Regarding implementation of security processes that protect customers but require customer
involvement (i.e. log-in credentials), firm operations are somewhat limited since the firm cannot
dictate security behaviors to a customer in the same way that requirements can be placed on
employees. For instance, businesses with websites or smartphone apps that have long, complicated
password requirements or require two-factor authentication may discourage many potential
customers from patronizing their site or app in the first place. The business needs to balance
security with ease of access and the risk of losing customers. One approach is to provide customers
with the option to leverage advanced security options, like two-factor authentication, and then
strongly encourage customers to make use of it. In this way, the firm transfers some risk to the
customer by providing them with the option to use strong security practices but gives them the
ability to decline if they do not wish to do so.
Throughout this paper, we have treated information security breaches as a strategic uncertainty
that creates significant risk for firms. However, in light of the proliferation and seeming
inevitability of security breaches, there might be a significant opportunity for firms to position
themselves based on security. As more consumers and businesses become aware of the significant
threat posed by insecure infrastructures and platforms, concerned users may be driven to seek
products and services that prominently feature security as a core component of the product or
service. For example, email provider ProtonMail (protonmail.com) offers secure and private email
communications. The success of positioning an organizational strategy partly or entirely on
security features would likely be contingent upon the extent to which customers become numb to
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the repeated announcement of large-scale breaches. If customers are largely apathetic, such a
strategy would likely only succeed as a niche positioning strategy—targeting the few who desire
security and are willing to pursue it. If customers become more aware of security risks and the
majority desire security, then such a strategy would have potential as a mass market strategy.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We do acknowledge the limitations of this paper. Ideally, primary data collected directly from
breached firms would offer deeper insight into the decision-making processes before, during and
after security breaches. However, gaining access to such data may be extremely difficult.
Additionally, we sought to offer practical advice for managers when engaging in decision-making
regarding investments in information security. Our intention is to drive more informed
conversation between top-level decision makers and IT personnel. Unfortunately, a complete and
in-depth discussion of the risk management process is outside the scope of this paper, but we hope
the topics discussed here will inform more intelligent decision-making when engaging in risk
management analysis and planning.
Future research should consider expanding upon the conceptual framework (see Figure 1) that
we advanced. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop a framework focused
on the strategic consequences of information technology and security failures, whereas taxonomies
of specific IT operational failures are readily available. We hope the strategic focus of the
framework will provide a foundation for further scholarship in this area. Additionally, future
research should consider further investigation of the specific problem issues we addressed. For
example, the trends towards more security breaches and indicators of “breach fatigue” among
consumers suggest changing cultural attitudes towards the consequences of such breaches. Future
research should consider evaluating the potential for changes in consumer and investor attitudes
towards breaches and if they correlate with reduced consequences for firms following breaches.
CONCLUSION
Security breaches are a complex and continually changing phenomenon that create a unique
strategic problem for organizational decision-makers. There are numerous factors that exacerbate
the level of strategic uncertainty associated with the pursuit of information security, and security
breaches seem to be an inevitability for many organizations. Although the financial repercussions
may be limited in the long-term, recent history suggests that organizations are beginning to hold
top executives responsible. As a result, it becomes imperative for top decision-makers to
understand why security breaches are an ongoing threat and to have a grasp on the many factors
that make such information security threats hard to understand and manage.
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